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Abstract
The notions of common knowledge or common belief play an important role in several areas of
computer science (e.g. distributed systems, communication), in philosophy, game theory, artificial
intelligence, psychology and many other fields which deal with the interaction within a group of
“agents”, agreement or coordinated actions. In the following we will present several deductive
systems for common knowledge above epistemic logics – such as K, T, S4 and S5 – with a fixed
number of agents. We focus on structural and proof-theoretic properties of these calculi.
© 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
The notions of common knowledge or common belief play an important role in several
areas of computer science (e.g. distributed systems, communication), in philosophy, game
theory, artificial intelligence, psychology and many other fields which deal with the
interaction within a group of “agents”, agreement or coordinated actions. Everybody has a
vague intuitive understanding of what common knowledge (belief) should be, and for a lot
of applications such informal approaches may suffice. On the other hand, in many cases a
formal mathematical treatment of common knowledge (belief) is required.
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There are two main directions in developing formalizations of reasoning with and about
common knowledge:
• Barwise (cf. e.g. [3,4]) discusses common knowledge within his Situation Semantics
and his general treatment Situation in Logic. Basic ingredients are the sets SIT of
situations and FACTS of facts.
• Alternatively, common knowledge may be studied by starting off from epistemic logics,
i.e. in the context of multi-modal logics; see the textbooks by Fagin, Halpern, Moses and
Vardi [5] and Meyer and van der Hoek [12] for a good introduction.
Although being built up from different “atoms”, there exist interesting connections between
these two formal frameworks for common knowledge. For example, largest fixed points
of suitable operators are used in a crucial way in both cases. In this article, however,
we will confine ourselves to common knowledge in its multi-modal version. More about
its relationship to common knowledge à la Barwise can be found in Graf [7] and
Lismont [11].
In the following we will present several deductive systems for common knowledge
above epistemic logics – such as K, T, S4 and S5 – with a fixed number of agents. We focus
on structural and proof-theoretic properties of these calculi, in particular in connection with
cuts and cut elimination.
For completeness we recall the basic syntactic and semantic notions of our logics of
common knowledge and introduce their standard Hilbert-style formulations. In the later
sections we turn to finitary and infinitary Tait-calculi, and present results about partial
cut elimination for the finitary system and total cut elimination for the infinitary one. In
addition we study two interesting finite and cut-free fragments of the infinitary calculus.
2. Syntax and semantics of logics of common knowledge
Let Ln(C) be our standard language for multi-modal logic which comprises a set
PROP of atomic propositions, typically indicated by P, Q, . . . (possibly with subscripts),
the propositional connectives ∨ and ∧, the epistemic operators K1, K2, . . . , Kn and the
common knowledge operator C; in addition we assume that there is an auxiliary symbol
∼ for forming the complements of atomic propositions and dual epistemic operators. The
formulas α, β, γ, . . . (possibly with subscripts) of Ln(C) and the depth dpt(α) for each
Ln(C) formula α are inductively generated as follows:
1. All atomic propositions P and their complements ∼P are Ln(C) formulas;
dpt(P) := dpt(∼P) := 0.
2. If α and β are Ln(C) formulas, so are (α ∨ β) and (α ∧ β);
dpt((α ∨ β)) := dpt((α ∧ β)) := max(dpt(α), dpt(β)) + 1.
3. If α is an Ln(C) formula, so are Ki (α) and ∼Ki (α);
dpt(Ki (α)) := dpt(∼Ki (α)) := dpt(α) + 1.
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4. If α is an Ln(C) formula, so are C(α) and ∼C(α);
dpt(C(α)) := dpt(∼C(α)) := dpt(α) + n + 1.
See below for an explanation why the number n, i.e. the number of agents, has to be added
in the last clause. The Ln(C) formulas ∼P act as negations of the atomic proposition
P; the duals ∼Ki and ∼C of the modal operators Ki and C, respectively, are needed in
forming the negations ¬α of general Ln(C) formulas α (by making use of de Morgan’s
laws and the law of double negation):
1. If α is the atomic proposition P , then ¬α is ∼P; if α is the formula ∼P , then ¬α
is P .
2. If α is the formula (β ∨ γ ), then ¬α is (¬β ∧¬γ ); if α is the formula (β ∧ γ ), then ¬α
is (¬β ∨ ¬γ ).
3. If α is the formula Ki (β), then ¬α is ∼Ki (¬β); if α is the formula ∼Ki (β), then ¬α is
Ki (¬β).
4. If α is the formula C(β), then ¬α is ∼C(¬β); if α is the formula ∼C(β), then ¬α is
C(¬β).
Often we omit parentheses if there is no danger of confusion and abbreviate the remaining
logical connectives as usual; in addition we set
E(α) := K1(α) ∧ · · · ∧ Kn(α).
The definition of the depth of the formulas C(α) and ∼C(α) has been tailored so that we
always have
dpt(E(α)) = dpt(∼E(α)) < dpt(C(α)) = dpt(∼C(α)).
A possible intuitive interpretation of Ki (α) is “agent i knows (believes) that α”, and thus
E(α) can be understood as “everybody knows (believes) that α”. The latter formula has to
be strictly distinguished from C(α), which expresses common knowledge of α among the
agents 1 to n (see below). We also need the iterations Em(α) for all natural numbers m,
inductively introduced as
E0(α) := α and Em+1(α) := E(Em(α)).
Turning to the semantics of Ln(C), we define a Kripke-frame (for Ln(C)) to be an (n +1)-
tuple
M = (W,K1, . . . ,Kn)
for a non-empty set W of worlds and binary relations K1, . . . ,Kn on W ; the set of worlds
of a Kripke-frameM is often denoted by |M|. A valuation inM then is a function V from
the atomic propositions PROP to the power set Pow(|M|) of |M|,
V : PROP → Pow(|M|).
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The truth-set ‖α‖MV of an Ln(C) formula α with respect to the Kripke-frame M =
(W,K1, . . . ,Kn) and a valuation V is defined, as usual in multi-modal logics, by induction
an the complexity of α with an additional clause for treating the operator C:
‖P‖MV := V(P),
‖∼P‖MV := W \ ‖P‖MV ,
‖α ∨ β‖MV := ‖α‖MV ∪ ‖β‖MV ,
‖α ∧ β‖MV := ‖α‖MV ∩ ‖β‖MV ,
‖Ki (α)‖MV := {v ∈ W : w ∈ ‖α‖MV for all w so that (v, w) ∈ Ki },
‖∼Ki (α)‖MV := W \ ‖Ki (¬α)‖MV ,
‖C(α)‖MV :=
⋂{‖Em(α)‖MV : m ≥ 1},
‖∼C(α)‖MV := W \ ‖C(¬α)‖MV .
By means of these truth-sets we can easily express that the Ln(C) formula α is valid in the
Kripke-frameM with respect to valuation V and world w; this is the case if w ∈ ‖α‖MV .
The following notation is convenient for expressing this situation:
(M,V, w) |= α :⇐⇒ w ∈ ‖α‖MV .
Observe that these semantics do not imply that α is true in all worlds which satisfy C(α). In
the literature sometimes a distinction is made between knowledge and belief: knowledge of
a fact implies the truth of this fact, whereas the belief of something may be compatible with
its falsity. But since the intuitive meaning of knowledge or belief can only be approximated
and can never be completely grasped by formal semantics, we will not pay attention to this
subtlety.
If we have (M,V, w) |= α for all valuations V in M and all worlds w ∈ |M| of a
Kripke-frameM, then α is valid inM,
M |= α.
Our semantics reflects the so-called iterative interpretation of common knowledge:
(M,V, w) |= C(α) ⇐⇒ (M,V, w) |=
∧
m≥1
Em(α).
Thus α is common knowledge if everybody knows α and everybody knows that everybody
knows α and everybody knows that everybody knows that everybody knows α and so on.
Alternatively, we could also treat common knowledge in the sense of the greatest fixed
point interpretation since
‖C(α)‖MV =
⋃{
X ⊂ |M| : X = ‖E(α) ∧ E(Q)‖MV [Q:=X ]
} ()
where Q is chosen to be an atomic proposition which does not occur in α and V[Q := X]
is the valuation which maps Q to X and otherwise agrees with V . A proof of () can be
found, for example, in Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi [5].
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Property () follows from the continuity of the operator defined by the formula
(E(α)∧E(Q)). There are variants of common knowledge like -common knowledge or -
common knowledge so that C(α) and C(α) cannot be characterized by the union of the
finite iterations of the corresponding operators; then only the greatest fixed point approach
makes sense (cf. e.g. [8,5]).
Now we recall the Hilbert-style formulations of a few multi-modal logics of common
knowledge. We begin with the usual logic K, extended to n agents plus C, and denote it by
Kn(C).
Basic axioms of Kn(C)
All propositional tautologies (TAUT)
Ki (α) ∧ Ki (α → β) → Ki (β) (K)
Basic rules of inference of Kn(C)
α α → β
β
(MP)
α
Ki (α)
(NEC)
Co-closure axioms of Kn(C)
C(α) → (E(α) ∧ E(C(α))) (CCL)
Induction rules of Kn(C)
β → E(α) ∧ E(β)
β → C(α) (IND)
In these axioms and rules and in the ones which will be formulated below, α and β may be
arbitrary Ln(C) formulas. The system Tn(C) is obtained from Kn(C) by adding all axioms
Ki (α) → α. (T)
S4n(C) is the multi-modal version of S4 with common knowledge and extends Tn(C) by
all axioms (4) for positive introspection
Ki (α) → Ki (Ki (α)). (4)
Finally, adding the corresponding axioms (5) of negative introspection to the theory S4n(C)
gives the system S5n(C),
¬Ki (α) → Ki (¬Ki (α)). (5)
Now let F be one of the theories Kn(C), Tn(C), S4n(C) or S5n(C). We employ the standard
notion of provability of an Ln(C) formula α in the theory F and write this fact as
F  α.
A Kripke-frameM is a model of F if all axioms of F are valid in M and if M is closed
under the rules of inference of F with respect to validity. A standard result of modal
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logic characterizes the Kripke-framesM = (W,K1, . . . ,Kn) which are models of these
theories:
(1) M is a model of Kn(C) for arbitrary (binary) K1, . . . ,Kn .
(2) M is a model of Tn(C) if and only if the K1, . . . ,Kn are reflexive.
(3) M is a model of S4n(C) if and only if the K1, . . . ,Kn are reflexive and transitive.
(4) M is a model of S5n(C) if and only if the K1, . . . ,Kn are equivalence relations.
Following the standard patterns, we call the Ln(C) formula α a semantic consequence of F,
F |= α,
if α is valid in all models of F. The subsequent theorem states that syntactic derivability is
adequate for semantic consequence in all our logics.
Theorem 1 (Soundness and Completeness). Let F be one of the logics Kn(C), Tn(C),
S4n(C) or S5n(C). Then we have
F  α ⇐⇒ F |= α.
Let us now come back to the co-closure axioms and induction rules of, say, Kn(C). The
axiom (CCL) states that each formula C(α) describes a set of states co-closed under the
operator
Opα(X) := E(α) ∧ E(X)
mapping sets of states to sets of states, with respect to a given frame and valuation. The
rules (IND), on the other hand, formulate that C(α) is the greatest (definable) set co-closed
under Opα . So we immediately obtain that C(α) is the largest fixed point of Opα , i.e.
Kn(C)  C(α) ↔ E(α) ∧ E(C(α)).
Proof-theoretic experience should provide a clear indication that the interplay of (CCL)
and (IND) may cause serious difficulties in finding good deductive systems for Kn(C) and
the other multi-modal logics mentioned before.
3. A Tait-style reformulation of Kn(C)
In this and the following sections we will look more carefully at the deductive
and procedural aspects of our logics of common knowledge. For simplicity we restrict
ourselves to the theory Kn(C); other logics are treated in Alberucci [2,1].
Obviously, inference rules like modus ponens (MP), which violate the subformula
property, make reasonable backward proof search impossible. The first steps thus are a
reformulation of Kn(C) as a Tait-style system with cuts and an attempt to “tame” general
cuts in a suitable way.
The Tait-calculus Kn(C) derives finite sets of Ln(C) formulas which are denoted by the
capital Greek letters Γ ,∆,Π ,Σ . . . (possibly with subscripts) and have to be interpreted
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disjunctively. We often write (for example) α, β,Γ ,∆ for the union {α, β} ∪ Γ ∪ ∆. In
addition, if Γ is the set {α1, . . . , αm}, we often use the following convenient abbreviations:
Γ∨ := α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αm ,
¬Γ := {¬α1, . . . ,¬αm},
¬Ki (Γ ) := {¬Ki (α1), . . . ,¬Ki (αm)},
¬C(Γ ) := {¬C(α1), . . . ,¬C(αm)}.
The axioms and rules of Kn(C) consist of the usual propositional axioms and rules of Tait-
calculi, of rules for the epistemic operators Ki with incorporated formulas ¬C(∆) plus
specific C-rules and induction rules.
Axioms of Kn(C)
P,¬P,Γ (ID)
Basic rules of inference of Kn(C)
α, β,Γ
α ∨ β,Γ (∨)
α,Γ β,Γ
α ∧ β,Γ (∧)
α,¬Γ ,¬C(∆)
Ki (α),¬Ki (Γ ),¬C(∆),Π (Ki )
C-rules of Kn(C)
¬E(α),Γ
¬C(α),Γ (¬C)
E(α),¬C(∆)
C(α),¬C(∆),Π (C)
Induction rules of Kn(C)
¬β, E(α),¬C(∆) ¬β, E(β),¬C(∆)
¬β, C(α),¬C(∆),Π (Ind)
The axioms and rules of our Tait-style formalization of Kn(C) do not comprise cuts; since
we want to distinguish between various cut rules, we always mention explicitly what sort
of cuts we use.
Now we introduce the usual cuts, called general cuts in our present context; restrictions
of the cut rule will be discussed later.
General cuts
α,Γ ¬α,Γ
Γ
(G-Cut)
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The designated formulas α and ¬α are called the cut formulas of this general cut.
Derivability of a finite set Γ of Ln(C) formulas in Kn(C) with possible additional cuts
from (∗-Cut) is introduced as usual and written as
Kn(C) + (∗-Cut)  Γ .
Before saying more about general and special cuts, we have to make sure that Kn(C) +
(G-Cut) is a reformulation of Kn(C). One direction is straightforward and is formulated
below.
Lemma 2. For all finite sets Γ of Ln(C) formulas we have that
Kn(C) + (G-Cut)  Γ =⇒ Kn(C)  Γ∨.
The proof of this lemma is unproblematic but requires some tedious work within the theory
Kn(C) which we omit. For establishing the reduction of Kn(C) to Kn(C) + (G-Cut), it
is convenient to begin with some auxiliary considerations. A first remark refers to the
propositional completeness and the co-closure properties of Kn(C).
Lemma 3. For all Ln(C) formulas α the following two assertions can be proved in Kn(C):
1. ¬α, α.
2. ¬C(α), E(α) ∧ E(C(α)).
Proof. The first assertion can be easily established by induction on the depth dpt(α) of α;
details are left to the reader. Thus we have
Kn(C)  ¬E(α), E(α), (1)
Kn(C)  ¬C(α), C(α). (2)
From (1) we can immediately deduce by rule (¬C) that
Kn(C)  ¬C(α), E(α). (3)
Moreover, (2) and applications of the rules (K1), . . . , (Kn) and (∧) yield
Kn(C)  ¬C(α), E(C(α)). (4)
Altogether, statements (3) and (4) plus once more the rule (∧) give us what we want. 
Lemma 4. Let α and β be two Ln(C) formulas so that
Kn(C) + (G-Cut)  β → E(α) ∧ E(β).
Then we also have that
Kn(C) + (G-Cut)  β → C(α).
This lemma is a direct consequence of the induction rule (Ind) of our calculus and some
trivial formula manipulations within Kn(C). Thus, recapitulating what we have obtained
so far, we see that Kn(C) + (G-Cut) is a Tait-style reformulation of Kn(C).
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Theorem 5. For all finite sets Γ of Ln(C) formulas we have that
Kn(C) + (G-Cut)  Γ ⇐⇒ Kn(C)  Γ∨.
Proof. The direction from left to right is a direct consequence of Lemma 2. In order to
prove the converse direction, we first observe that the basic axioms of Kn(C) are trivially
derivable in Kn(C) and that the co-closure axioms are proved in Lemma 3(2). Hence all
axioms of Kn(C) are provable in Kn(C). Since Lemma 4 states that Kn(C) + (G-Cut) is
closed under the induction rule of Kn(C) and since all other derivation rules of Kn(C) have
obvious counterparts in Kn(C) + (G-Cut), the direction from right to left of our theorem
follows by induction on the derivations in Kn(C). 
The rule (G-Cut) is a stumbling block to using Kn(C) + (G-Cut) as a meaningful
procedural framework for common knowledge. However, total cut elimination for this
calculus is not possible. Let us work with two agents only, choose two different atomic
propositions P and Q and consider the formula α given by
¬K1(P ∧ C(Q)) ∨ ¬K2(Q ∧ C(P)) ∨ C(P ∨ Q).
Then it can be easily checked that Kn(C) |= α; hence Kn(C) + (G-Cut)  α in view of
Theorems 1 and 5. But it is also not too complicated to show that α cannot be proved in
(the cut-free system) Kn(C).
Because of this and related examples we doubt that there is a natural and perspicuous
(more sophisticated) cut-free Tait- or Gentzen-calculus which is equivalent to Kn(C) and
enjoys the subformula property.
4. Fischer–Ladner cuts
An interesting partial cut elimination result for a Tait-style version of Kn(C) is obtained
by restricting cuts to specific formulas generated from the so-called Fischer–Ladner
closure of provable formulas. The exact details will be described below; first we introduce
some auxiliary notions.
LetΩ be a set of Ln(C) formulas which is closed under negation; i.e.Ω has the property
that Ω = ¬Ω . Then the Ω -cuts are all cuts
α,Γ ¬α,Γ
Γ
(Ω -Cut)
so that their cut formulas α and ¬α belong to the set Ω . Such Ω -cuts, for very specific sets
of formulas Ω , will play an important role later.
Lemma 6. Let Ω be a set of Ln(C) formulas which is closed under negation. Then we
have for all finite sets Γ of Ln(C) formulas and all formulas (α ∨ β) and (α0 ∧ α1) which
belong to Ω :
1. Kn(C) + (Ω -Cut)  (α ∨ β),Γ =⇒ Kn(C) + (Ω -Cut)  α, β,Γ .
2. Kn(C) + (Ω -Cut)  (α0 ∧ α1),Γ =⇒ Kn(C) + (Ω -Cut)  αi ,Γ .
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Proof. Obvious derivations in Kn(C) yield that
Kn(C)  (¬α ∧ ¬β), α, β, (1)
Kn(C)  (¬α0 ∨ ¬α1), αi (2)
for i = 0, 1. Since the formulas (¬α ∧ ¬β) and (¬α0 ∨ ¬α1) belong to Ω , the assertions
of our lemma follow from (1) and (2) by simple Ω -cuts. 
For the next considerations let Ω and Σ be two sets of Ln(C) formulas which are closed
under negation and assume that Σ is a finite subset of Ω . For those Ω and Σ we introduce
as auxiliary notions:
• A finite subset Γ of Ln(C) formulas is called Ω -consistent in the case that
Kn(C) + (Ω -Cut)  ¬Γ .
• A subset Γ of Σ is called maximal Ω -consistent with respect to Σ if Γ is Ω -consistent
and if there exists no Ω -consistent subset of Σ which is a proper superset of Γ .
Some important properties of maximalΩ -consistent sets with respect toΣ are summarized
in the subsequent lemma. Its proof is standard and can be omitted.
Lemma 7. Let Ω and Σ be sets of Ln(C) formulas as above. Then we have for all
subsets Γ of Σ which are maximal Ω -consistent with respect to Σ and all Ln(C) formulas
α, β:
1. α ∈ Σ =⇒ α ∈ Γ or ¬α ∈ Γ .
2. α ∈ Σ and Kn(C) + (Ω -Cut)  α,¬Γ =⇒ α ∈ Γ .
3. α, β ∈ Σ and (α ∨ β) ∈ Γ =⇒ α ∈ Γ or β ∈ Γ .
4. α, β ∈ Σ and (α ∧ β) ∈ Γ =⇒ α ∈ Γ and β ∈ Γ .
Again, let Ω and Σ be sets of Ln(C) formulas as above. Each subset Γ of Σ which is
Ω -consistent can be easily extended to a maximal Ω -consistent set with respect to Σ . To
see why, simply fix an enumeration γ0, . . . , γk of Σ and define Γ0 := Γ as well as
Γi+1 :=
{
Γi ∪ {γi } if Γi ∪ {γi } is Ω -consistent with respect to Σ ,
Γi ∪ {¬γi } otherwise
for all natural numbers i ≤ k. Then simple induction on i ≤ k shows that each Γi is
Ω -consistent and contained in Σ . Hence the union of all sets Γi , 0 ≤ i ≤ k, is a possible
candidate for the set ∆ which is claimed to exist in the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Let Ω and Σ be sets of Ln(C) formulas as above and assume that Γ is an
Ω -consistent subset of Σ . Then there exists a subset∆ ofΣ which is maximalΩ -consistent
with respect to Σ and contains Γ .
Before formulating and proving the main results of this section, we have to fix those sets
of Ln(C) formulas which we have to substitute for Σ and Ω .
The so-called Fischer–Ladner closure FL(α) of an Ln(C) formula α (see Fischer and
Ladner [6]) is the set of Ln(C) formulas which is inductively generated as follows:
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1. α belongs to FL(α).
2. If β belongs to FL(α), then ¬β belongs to FL(α).
3. If (β ∨ γ ) belongs to FL(α), then β and γ belong to FL(α).
4. If (β ∧ γ ) belongs to FL(α), then β and γ belong to FL(α).
5. If Ki (β) belongs to FL(α), then β belongs to FL(α).
6. If C(β) belongs to FL(α), then β, E(β) and E(C(β)) belong to FL(α).
Moreover, for any finite set Γ of Ln(C) formulas, its Fischer–Ladner closure FL(Γ ) is
introduced by
FL(Γ ) := FL(Γ∨).
The Fischer–Ladner closure FL(α) of an Ln(C) formula α is obviously finite and,
according to [6], the number of elements of FL(α) is of order O(|α|) where |α| denotes
the length of the formula α.
Sets FL(Γ ) will take over the role of the set Σ in the previous considerations; the
counterpart of the set Ω will be the disjunctive–conjunctive closure DC(Γ ) of FL(Γ )
which is carefully introduced now.
Until the end of this section we fix an arbitrary finite set Γ of Ln(C) formulas and
associate to this Γ (arbitrary but fixed) enumerations
δ1, δ2, . . . , δp and ∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆q ()
of the elements of FL(Γ ) and the subsets of FL(Γ ), respectively. Each set ∆ ⊂ FL(Γ )
can then be written as
{δs(1), δs(2), . . . , δs(m∆)}
so that 1 ≤ s(1) < s(2) < · · · < s(m∆) ≤ p, and we define the Ln(C) formula
ϕ∆ := (. . . (δs(1) ∧ δs(2)) ∧ . . .) ∧ δs(m∆)). ()
In addition, each D ⊂ Pow(FL(Γ )) can be brought into the form
{∆t (1),∆t (2), . . . ,∆t (m D)}
so that 1 ≤ t (1) < t (2) < · · · < t (m D) ≤ q , and now we define
ϕD := (. . . (ϕ∆t (1) ∨ ϕ∆t (2)) ∨ . . .) ∨ ϕ∆t (m D) ).
Finally, we let DC(Γ ) be the set of all formulas ϕD, for D ⊂ Pow(FL(Γ )), and their
negations,
DC(Γ ) := {ϕD : D ⊂ Pow(FL(Γ ))} ∪ {¬ϕD : D ⊂ Pow(FL(Γ ))}.
According to these definitions, FL(Γ ) is contained in the set DC(Γ ). Furthermore, since
DC(Γ ) contains a representative (modulo logical equivalence) of each formula which is
built up from the elements of FL(Γ ) by disjunctions and conjunctions, it is justified to
regard it as the disjunctive–conjunctive closure of FL(Γ ).
Depending on Γ , we can introduce the canonical Kripke-frame
MΓ := (WΓ ,KΓ1 , . . . ,KΓn )
84 L. Alberucci, G. Jäger / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 133 (2005) 73–99
whose set of worlds WΓ is the collection of all maximal DC(Γ )-consistent sets with
respect to FL(Γ ); the accessibility relations KΓi consist of all pairs (∆,Σ ) of elements
of WΓ so that
∆/Ki := {α : Ki (α) ∈ ∆}
is contained in Σ , i.e.
K
Γ
i := {(∆,Σ ) ∈ WΓ × WΓ : ∆/Ki ⊂ Σ }.
The following lemma takes care of one specific case in the proof of Lemma 10 and is
treated separately in order to “disburden” this rather lengthy proof.
Lemma 9. Assume that∆ ∈ WΓ , (∆,Σ ) ∈ KΓi and C(α) ∈ ∆. Then we have C(α) ∈ Σ
and α ∈ Σ .
Proof. Recall from Lemma 3(2) that
Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  ¬C(α), E(C(α)), (1)
Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  ¬C(α), E(α). (2)
Since E(C(α)) and E(α) belong to FL(Γ ), we are in the position of applying Lemma 7(2)
to (1) and (2) and know that
E(C(α)) ∈ ∆, (3)
E(α) ∈ ∆. (4)
Because of Lemma 7(4) we thus have Ki (C(α)) ∈ ∆ and Ki (α) ∈ ∆. The definition of
K
Γ
i therefore implies the assertion of our lemma. 
As canonical valuation (with respect to Γ ) we fix the mapping VΓ from the atomic
propositions to Pow(WΓ ) given by
VΓ (P) := {∆ ∈ WΓ : P ∈ ∆}
for all elements P of PROP. With MΓ and VΓ being provided, we are ready for
establishing the main lemma for the proof of Theorem 11.
Lemma 10. Let Γ be our finite set of Ln(C) formulas. Then we have for all Σ ∈ WΓ and
all α ∈ FL(Γ ) that
α ∈ Σ ⇐⇒ (MΓ ,VΓ ,Σ ) |= α.
Proof. We show this equivalence by induction on the structure of the formula α and carry
through the following distinction by cases.
1. α is an atomic proposition or the negation of an atomic proposition. Then the assertion
follows from the definition of Vα.
2. α is of the form (β0 ∨ β1) or (β0 ∧ β1). Then the assertion follows from the induction
hypothesis by means of Lemma 7.
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3. α is of the form Ki (β). The direction from left to right is immediate from the definition
of KΓi and the induction hypothesis. For the converse direction, assume that Ki (β) /∈ Σ .
Then ¬Ki (β) ∈ Σ by Lemma 7(1) and
Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  Ki (β), {¬Ki (γ ) : Ki (γ ) ∈ Σ }. (1)
Because of the rule (Ki ) we therefore also have
Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  β, {¬γ : Ki (γ ) ∈ Σ }. (2)
This means that the set {¬β} ∪ {γ : Ki (γ ) ∈ Σ } is DC(Γ )-consistent. Since it is also
contained in FL(Γ ), Lemma 8 claims the existence of an element∆ of WΓ with
¬β ∈ ∆, (3)
{γ : Ki (γ ) ∈ Σ } ⊂ ∆. (4)
From (3) we conclude with the induction hypothesis that (MΓ ,VΓ ,∆) |= β. Further, (4)
yields that (Σ ,∆) ∈ KΓi . Hence (MΓ ,VΓ ,Σ ) |= Ki (β), and the direction from right to
left is proved.
4. α is of the form ∼Ki (β). The treatment of this case is analogous to the previous one.
5. α is of the form C(β). For showing the direction from left to right we assume C(β) ∈ Σ .
Lemma 9 and a simple proof by induction on m entails that
C(β) ∈ ∆ and β ∈ ∆ (5)
for all elements ∆ ∈ WΓ which are accessible from Σ in m steps. But then the induction
hypothesis implies
(MΓ ,VΓ ,∆) |= β (6)
for such ∆. Given the definition of the validity of the formula C(β), we have herewith
shown that (MΓ ,VΓ ,Σ ) |= C(β).
For dealing with the converse direction, we first recall the enumerations () and let
∆w(1),∆w(2), . . . ,∆w(u)
with 1 ≤ w(1) < w(2) < · · · < w(u) ≤ q be the list of all sets ∆ j so that
(MΓ ,VΓ ,∆ j ) |= C(β). Now introduce the formula ψC(β),
ψC(β) := (. . . (ϕ∆w(1) ∨ ϕ∆w(2) ) ∨ . . .) ∨ ϕ∆w(u))
for each ϕ∆w( j) being defined as in (). From the definition of DC(Γ ) above we learn that
ψC(β) ∈ DC(Γ ). For this formula ψC(β) we want to show:
Kn(C)  ¬ψC(β), E(β), (7)
Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  ¬ψC(β), E(ψC(β)). (8)
To prove (7), observe that
(MΓ ,VΓ ,∆) |= C(β) =⇒ (MΓ ,VΓ ,∆) |= E(β)
86 L. Alberucci, G. Jäger / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 133 (2005) 73–99
for all ∆ ∈ WΓ . Hence the induction hypothesis tells us that E(β) ∈ ∆w( j ) for
j = 1, . . . , u. Consequently, we have
Kn(C)  ¬ϕ∆w( j) , E(β) (9)
for j = 1, . . . , u. From (9) and the definition of ¬ψC(β) we obtain assertion (7) by some
obvious basic inferences.
The proof of (8) is more complicated. We first observe that for all ∆ ∈ WΓ
Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  ¬(∆/Ki ), {ϕ∆ j : j ∈ N∆} (10)
where N∆ is the set of all natural numbers given by
N∆ := { j : 1 ≤ j ≤ q and (∆,∆ j ) ∈ KΓi },
again referring to the enumerations (). If this were not the case, then we could pick for
each j ∈ N∆ a formula χ j ∈ ∆ j satisfying
Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  ¬(∆/Ki ), {χ j : j ∈ N∆}.
However, this would imply that the set
(∆/Ki ) ∪ {¬χ j : j ∈ N∆}
is DC(Γ )-consistent and therefore, by Lemma 8, contained in a set Π which is maximal
DC(Γ )-consistent with respect to FL(Γ ). But then we had (∆/Ki ) ⊂ Π , hence (∆,Π ) ∈
KΓi , and Π = ∆ j for all j ∈ N∆ because of the choice of the formulas χ j . This is a
contradiction, and (10) has been established.
The next step is to choose an arbitrary∆w(k) with 1 ≤ k ≤ u. By (10) we have
Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  ¬(∆w(k)/Ki ), ψC(β), (11)
simply because N∆w(k) ⊂ {w(1), w(2), . . . , w(u)}. By applying the rule (Ki ) to (11) we
gain
Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  ¬∆w(k), Ki (ψC(β)), (12)
hence also
Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  ¬∆w(k), E(ψC(β)), (13)
since (12) holds for all operators K1, . . . , Kn . Assertion (13) is immediately transformed
into
Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  ¬ϕ∆w(k) , E(ψC(β)) (14)
and available for all 1 ≤ k ≤ u. Therefore assertion (8) follows from (14) by several
applications of the rule (∧).
Having proved assertions (7) and (8), the induction rule (Ind) comes into play and yields
Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  ¬ψC(β), C(β). (15)
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Since ψC(β) belongs to DC(Γ ), assertion (15) gives us in view of Lemma 6(2) that
Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  ¬ϕ∆w(k)C(β) (16)
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ u. The formulas ϕ∆w(k) are elements of DC(Γ ) as well, and now we apply
Lemma 6(1) to (16) in order to obtain
Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  ¬∆w(k), C(β) (17)
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ u. To conclude the proof of the direction from right to left, assume that
Σ ∈ WΓ and
(MΓ ,VΓ ,Σ ) |= C(β).
Then the set Σ is identical to some∆w(k), 1 ≤ k ≤ u, and thus (17) entails
Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  ¬Σ , C(β). (18)
Finally we make use of Lemma 7(2) and gain C(β) ∈ Σ , as desired.
6. α is of the form ∼C(β). The treatment of this case is analogous to the previous one. 
Theorem 11. For all finite sets Γ of Ln(C) formulas we have that
Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  Γ ⇐⇒ Kn(C) |= Γ∨.
Proof. The direction from left to right of this equivalence is implied by Theorems 5 and 1.
Conversely, fix a finite set Γ of Ln(C) formulas and assume that
Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  Γ .
Then the formula Γ∨ is an element of FL(Γ ) ⊂ DC(Γ ), and Lemma 6(1) implies that
Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  Γ∨.
Hence {¬(Γ∨)} is DC(Γ )-consistent and, because of Lemma 8, there must be a set Σ
which contains ¬(Γ∨) and is maximal DC(Γ )-consistent with respect to FL(Γ ), i.e.
Σ ∈ WΓ and ¬(Γ∨) ∈ Σ .
Now we can apply the previous lemma in order to obtain
(MΓ ,VΓ ,Γ ) |= ¬(Γ∨).
So we know that Γ∨ is not valid in the canonicalMΓ , and, consequently, Kn(C) |= Γ∨.
This completes the proof of our theorem. 
Corollary 12 (Partial Cut Elimination for Kn(C)). For all finite sets Γ of Ln(C)
formulas we have that
Kn(C) + (G-Cut)  Γ ⇐⇒ Kn(C) + (DC(Γ )-Cut)  Γ .
The last assertion is a trivial consequence of Theorems 1, 5 and 11 just above. It says that
for each proof of a finite set Γ of Ln(C) formulas in the calculus Kn(C) + (G-Cut) there
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exists a proof with cuts so that all their cut formulas belong to the representation system
DC(Γ ) of the disjunctive–conjunctive closure of the Fischer–Ladner closure of Γ .
This corollary allows us to replace the infinite number of all possible cuts in a derivation
of a set Γ by cuts whose cut formulas belong to the finite set DC(Γ ). However, from the
point of view of efficient proof search, the cardinality of DC(Γ ) is still infeasible.
In [2,1] our partial cut elimination technique has been refined by showing that cuts with
cut formulas from the conjunctive closure of the Fischer–Ladner closure are sufficient.
It is an interesting question whether the cuts can be further restricted.
5. The infinitary system Kωn(C)
The iterative approach to common knowledge can most easily be reflected in a deductive
system by working with an analogue of the ω-rule which permits the derivation of the
formula C(α) from the infinitely many premises
E1(α), E2(α), . . . , Em(α), . . .
for all natural numbers m ≥ 1, just as in the semantic interpretation of C(α), introduced in
Section 2 above.
Our infinitary system Kωn (C) is formulated in the finitary language Ln(C) and derives
finite sets of Ln(C) formulas. It is infinitary only because of the rule (ωC) for introducing
common knowledge; (ωC) has infinitely many premises and thus may give rise to infinite
proof trees.
The axioms and basic rules of Kωn (C) are those of Kn(C); in particular we have the
rules (Ki ) for introducing the epistemic operators Ki and their negations,
α,¬Γ ,¬C(∆)
Ki (α),¬Ki (Γ ),¬C(∆),Π (Ki )
with the formulas Ki (α) and ¬Ki (Γ ) as main formulas and the negated formulas about
common knowledge as side formulas. As a further rule for introducing positive knowledge
we add
α
Ki (Em(α)),Π
(K)
for any natural number m. The rule (K) might appear to be superfluous for the following
reason: suppose that α is provable. Then a series of applications of the rules (K1), . . . , (Kn)
and (∧) allows us to derive Ki (Em(α)), Π for all m. However, these derivations depend on
m, whereas an application of (K) enables us to accomplish the same in one step. Together
with the rule (ωC) from below, we only need n additional steps to derive C(α) in the case
that α has been proved already. Without (K) infinitely many additional steps would be
required.
Negated common knowledge is introduced by the rule (¬C) as before; for positive
common knowledge we now have the infinitary rule (ωC).
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C-rules of Kωn (C)
¬E(α),Γ
¬C(α),Γ (¬C)
Em(α),Γ (for all m ≥ 1)
C(α),Γ (ωC)
Although all formulas of the language Ln(C) are finite strings of symbols, the rule (ωC)
has the effect of treating the formulas C(α) as the infinite conjunctions∧{Em(α) : m ≥ 1}.
Accordingly, the rank me(α) of each Ln(C) formula α is an ordinal which is inductively
generated as follows:
1. me(P) := me(∼P) := 0.
2. me(α ∨ β) := me(α ∧ β) := max(me(α), me(β)) + 1.
3. me(Ki (α)) := me(∼Ki (α)) := me(α) + 1.
4. me(C(α)) := me(∼C(α)) := sup(me(Em(α) : m ≥ 1).
Because of the rule (ωC), our system Kωn (C) allows proof trees which consist of infinitely
many nodes, and thus ordinals, which are denoted by the small Greek letters σ, τ, η, ξ, . . .
(possibly with subscripts) come into the picture.
Starting from these axioms and rules of inference, derivability in Kωn (C) is introduced as
usual. For arbitrary ordinals σ and finite sets Γ of Ln(C) formulas the notion Kωn (C) σ Γ
is defined by induction on σ as follows:
1. If Γ is an axiom of Kωn (C), then we have Kωn (C) σ Γ for all σ .
2. If Kωn (C) σi Γi and σi < σ for all premises Γi of a rule of Kωn (C), then we have
Kωn (C) σ Γ for the conclusion Γ of this rule.
Kωn (C) <σ Γ means Kωn (C) τ Γ for some ordinal τ < σ , and Kωn (C)  Γ means
Kωn (C) τ Γ for some ordinal τ .
If general cuts (G-Cut) are added to our legitimate rules of inference, we define the
corresponding notions
Kωn (C) + (G-Cut) σ Γ and Kωn (C) + (G-Cut)  Γ
of derivability of the finite set Γ of Ln(C) formulas in the extended system Kωn (C) +
(G-Cut) accordingly.
Two structural properties of Kωn (C) – weakening and inversion – will play a certain
role in the next section. Both can be established trivially by induction on the derivations
involved.
Lemma 13 (Weakening). For all finite sets Γ ,∆ of Ln(C) formulas and all ordinals σ, τ
we have that
Γ ⊂ ∆, σ ≤ τ and Kωn (C) σ Γ =⇒ Kωn (C) τ ∆.
Lemma 14 (Inversion). For all finite sets Γ of Ln(C) formulas, all Ln(C) formulas α, β
and all ordinals σ we have:
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1. Kωn (C) σ α ∨ β,Γ =⇒ Kωn (C) σ α, β,Γ .
2. Kωn (C) σ α ∧ β,Γ =⇒ Kωn (C) σ α,Γ and Kωn (C) σ β,Γ .
Likewise, weakening and inversion can also be accomplished for the extended system
Kωn (C) + (G-Cut). However, since we do not need them in this form, we omit formulating
them explicitly.
Straightforward – in general transfinite – induction on the lengths of derivations yields
the correctness of Kωn (C) + (G-Cut) with respect to the semantics introduced in Section 2.
This means that we have the following theorem.
Theorem 15. For all finite sets Γ of Ln(C) formulas we have that
Kωn (C) + (G-Cut)  Γ =⇒ Kn(C) |= Γ∨.
The converse of this theorem is also true; we will even prove a much stronger form of
completeness later. The next two lemmas deal with the co-closure and induction properties
of Kn(C) and illustrate the use of the infinitary rule (ωC).
As for the system Kn(C), we first observe that Kωn (C) is propositionally complete and
proves the co-closure axioms of Kn(C). Because of the infinitary rule (ωC), however,
infinitary derivations may arise.
Lemma 16. For all Ln(C) formulas α the following two assertions can be proved in
Kωn (C):
1. ¬α, α.
2. ¬C(α), E(α) ∧ E(C(α)).
Proof. The first part of this lemma can be easily established by induction on the structure
of α; since the rule (ωC) has to be used for showing assertions of the form
Kωn (C)  ¬C(β), C(β)
proofs of infinite depth are needed in general. The second part of this lemma follows from
the first exactly as in the proof of Lemma 3. 
The rule (ωC) also enables us to deal with the induction rules of Kn(C) within
Kωn (C) + (G-Cut), the price being again the use of infinite derivations.
Lemma 17. Let α and β be Ln(C) formulas and suppose that
Kωn (C) + (G-Cut)  β → E(α) ∧ E(β).
Then we also have that
Kωn (C) + (G-Cut)  β → C(α).
Proof. We work informally in Kωn (C) + (G-Cut) and obtain from the assumption that
¬β, E(α), (1)
¬β, E(β). (2)
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From (1) and (2) we deduce by several applications of the rules (K1), . . . , (Kn) and some
intermediate steps that
¬Em(β), Em+1(α), (3)
¬Em(β), Em+1(β) (4)
for all natural numbers m. Therefore, a series of cuts yields
¬β, Em+1(α) (5)
for all natural numbers m. We can thus apply the rule (ωC) in order to conclude that
¬β, C(α). (6)
Since the length of the derivation of (5) is m or more, this derivation of (6) is infinite. Some
trivial modifications of (6) finish our proof. 
Lemmas 16 and 17 make it clear that the Hilbert system Kn(C) can be embedded into
Kωn (C) + (G-Cut). Recalling Theorems 1 and 15, we can state the following intermediate
result.
Theorem 18. For all finite sets Γ of Ln(C) formulas we have that
Kωn (C) + (G-Cut)  Γ ⇐⇒ Kn(C)  Γ∨.
The proof of the inclusion of Kn(C) in Kωn (C) + (G-Cut) given above has only been
included in order to illustrate the use of the rules (Ki ), (¬C) and (ωC) in this infinitary
system. It also follows from the fact that Kωn (C), i.e. the system without any cuts, is
complete. This completeness result for Kωn (C) will be proved now by semantic methods.
A finite set Γ of Ln(C) formulas is called Kωn (C) saturated if the following conditions
are satisfied:
(ωS.1) Kωn (C)  Γ .
(ωS.2) For all Ln(C) formulas (α ∨ β) we have
(α ∨ β) ∈ Γ =⇒ α ∈ Γ and β ∈ Γ .
(ωS.3) For all Ln(C) formulas (α ∧ β) we have
(α ∧ β) ∈ Γ =⇒ α ∈ Γ or β ∈ Γ .
(ωS.4) For all Ln(C) formulas ¬C(α) we have
¬C(α) ∈ Γ =⇒ ¬E(α) ∈ Γ .
(ωS.5) For all Ln(C) formulas C(α) we have
C(α) ∈ Γ =⇒ Em(α) ∈ Γ for some m ≥ 1.
If Γ is a finite set of Ln(C) formulas which is not provable in Kωn (C) and which, in
addition, is not Kωn (C) saturated, then one of the conditions (ωS.2) to (ωS.5) is violated
for Γ . By systematically correcting such deficiencies, we can extend any finite set Γ of
Ln(C) formulas which is not provable in Kωn (C) to a Kωn (C) saturated set.
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Lemma 19. For every finite set Γ of Ln(C) formulas which is not provable in Kωn (C) there
exists a Kωn (C) saturated set ∆ which contains Γ .
Proof. We assume that we have fixed an enumeration δ0, δ1, . . . of all Ln(C) formulas. If
the formula α is the formula δi in this enumeration, we call i the index of α.
Depending on this enumeration we now define for each finite set Π of Ln(C) formulas
which is not provable in Kωn (C) a new set Π ′:
1. If Π is Kωn (C) saturated, then Π ′ := Π .
2. If Π is not Kωn (C) saturated, then we choose the formula α with the smallest index for
which one of the conditions (ωS.1)–(ωS.5) is violated and determineΠ ′ by distinguishing
between the possible forms of α.
2.1. α is of the form (β ∨ γ ). Then we set
Π ′ := Π ∪ {β, γ }.
2.2. α is of the form (β ∧ γ ). Since Π is not provable in Kωn (C) we know that
Kωn (C)  β,Π or Kωn (C)  γ,Π .
Then we set
Π ′ :=
{
Π ∪ {β} if Kωn (C)  β,Π ,
Π ∪ {γ } otherwise.
2.3. α is of the form C(β). Since Π is not provable in Kωn (C) we know that
Kωn (C)  Em(β),Π
for some natural number m ≥ 1. We choose the least such k and set
Π ′ := Π ∪ {Ek(β)}.
2.4. α is of the form ¬C(β). Then we set
Π ′ := Π ∪ {¬E(β)}.
Observe that this construction implies that the so defined Π ′ is not provable in Kωn (C).
In the next step we assign to each finite setΠ of Ln(C) formulas which is not provable in
Kωn (C) its deficiency-number dn(Π ). IfΠ is Kωn (C) saturated, then dn(Π ) := 0. Otherwise
fix the set {α1, α2, . . . , αm} of all elements of Π for which one of the conditions (ωS.1)–
(ωS.5) is violated and set
dn(Π ) := ωme(α1) # ωme(α2) # · · · # ωme(αm)
where we make use of the natural sum of ordinals as introduced, for example, in
Schütte [13].
Now we take the given finite set Γ of Ln(C) formulas which is not provable in Kωn (C)
and define the sequence Γ0,Γ1, . . . of finite sets by
Γ0 := Γ and Γm+1 := Γ ′m
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for all natural numbers m. What we have done so far guarantees that
Γ ⊂ Γm, (1)
Kωn (C)  Γm , (2)
dn(Γm) = 0 =⇒ dn(Γm+1) < dn(Γm) (3)
for all natural numbers m. Since there are no infinite decreasing sequences of ordinals,
one of the sets Γm has to be Kωn (C) saturated and is a possible candidate for the choice
of∆. 
Before turning to the intended Kripke-frame Sω, we introduce for all finite sets Γ of
Ln(C) formulas the following shorthand notations:
(Γ ∩ ¬Ki ) := {¬Ki (α) : ¬Ki (α) ∈ Γ },
(Γ ∩ ¬C) := {¬C(α) : ¬C(α) ∈ Γ },
(Γ/¬Ki ) := {¬α : ¬Ki (α) ∈ Γ }.
Then the Kripke-frame Sω, which is built up by the Kωn (C) saturated sets, is the Kripke-
frame
Sω := (Satω,Kω1 ,Kω2 , . . . ,Kωn )
whose universe Satω is the set of all Kωn (C) saturated sets and whose accessibility relations
K
ω
i comprise exactly those pairs (Γ ,∆) ∈ Satω × Satω such that
• α ∈ ∆ and Ki (α) ∈ Γ for some Ln(C) formula α,
• (Γ/¬Ki ) ∪ (Γ ∩ ¬C) ⊂ ∆.
Based on these relations Kω1 , . . . ,Kωn we define the reachability in m steps of a set
∆ ∈ Satω from a set Γ ∈ Satω by induction on m as follows:
(i) Γ is reachable from Γ in 0 steps.
(ii) ∆ is reachable from Γ in m + 1 steps if and only if there exist an i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and a
set Π ∈ Satω so that Π is reachable from Γ in m steps and (Π ,∆) ∈ Kωi .
∆ is called reachable from Γ if ∆ is reachable from Γ in m steps for some natural
number m. Observe that the definition of the relations Kω1 , . . . ,Kωn immediately implies
the following property.
Lemma 20. Assume Γ ,∆ ∈ Satω. If ∆ is reachable from Γ , then we have for all Ln(C)
formulas α that
¬C(α) ∈ Γ =⇒ ¬C(α) ∈ ∆.
For the Kripke-frame Sω we also fix the valuation Vω from the atomic propositions to
Pow(Satω) defined by
Vω(P) := {Γ ∈ Satω : P /∈ Γ }.
This finishes this construction and allows us to prove the following lemma, which is the
core in proving the completeness of Kωn (C).
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Lemma 21. For all Ln(C) formulas α and all Γ ∈ Satω we have that
α ∈ Γ =⇒ (Sω,Vω,Γ ) |= α.
Proof. We obtain this implication by induction on the structure of α and distinguish the
following cases.
1. α is an atomic proposition or the negation of an atomic proposition. Then the assertion
follows from the definition of Vω.
2. α is of the form (β ∨ γ ), (β ∧ γ ) or C(β). Then the assertion follows immediately from
the induction hypothesis since Γ is Kωn (C) saturated.
3. α is of the form Ki (β). We know that Γ is Kωn (C) saturated, and thus Kωn (C)  Γ . Hence
we also have
Kωn (C)  α, (Γ ∩ ¬Ki ), (Γ ∩ ¬C). (1)
Because of the form of the rule (Ki ) this implies
Kωn (C)  β, (Γ/¬Ki ), (Γ ∩ ¬C). (2)
Moreover, in view of Lemma 19, there exists a set ∆ ∈ Satω so that {β} ∪ (Γ/¬Ki ) ∪
(Γ ∩ ¬C) is contained in ∆. This implies, in particular, that
β ∈ ∆, (3)
(Γ ,∆) ∈ Kωi . (4)
From the induction hypothesis and (3) we obtain
(Sω,Vω,∆) |= β.
This implies the assertion since, by (4), ∆ is reachable in one step from Γ via the
accessibility relation Kωi .
4. α is of the form ∼Ki (β). In this case we carry though the following further distinction.
4.1. There exists no ∆ so that (Γ ,∆) ∈ Kωi . Then we obviously must have that
(Sω,Vω,Γ ) |= Ki (¬β), hence also (Sω,Vω,Γ ) |= α.
4.2. There exists a ∆ so that (Γ ,∆) ∈ Kωi . By the definition of Kωi we have β ∈ ∆ for all
∆ so that (Γ ,∆) ∈ Kωi . Therefore, the induction hypothesis implies
(Sω,Vω,∆) |= β (5)
for all ∆ so that (Γ ,∆) ∈ Kωi . From this observation we can immediately deduce that
(Sω,Vω,Γ ) |= Ki (¬β). (6)
However, this is exactly our assertion that (Sω,Vω,Γ ) |= α since α is the formula ∼Ki (β)
in this case.
5. α is of the form ∼C(β). Consequently, because of Lemma 20, ¬C(¬β) ∈ ∆ for all
sets ∆ which are reachable from Γ . All these ∆ are Kωn (C) saturated, and so we have
¬E(¬β) ∈ ∆. We apply the induction hypothesis and obtain
(Sω,Vω,∆) |= ¬E(¬β) i.e. (Sω,Vω,∆) |= E(¬β) (7)
L. Alberucci, G. Jäger / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 133 (2005) 73–99 95
for all ∆ which are reachable from Γ . But since (Sω,Vω,Γ ) |= Ek+1(¬β) is equivalent
to the fact that (Sω,Vω,∆) |= E(¬β) for all ∆ which are reachable from Γ in k steps,
assertion (7) gives us
(Sω,Vω,Γ ) |= Em(¬β) (8)
for all natural numbers m ≥ 1. This implies (Sω,Vω,Γ ) |= C(¬β), hence
(Sω,Vω,Γ ) |= α and finishes the proof of our lemma. 
Theorem 22 (Completeness of Kωn (C)). If the Ln(C) formula α is valid in all Kripke-
frames for Ln(C), then we have Kωn (C)  α.
Proof. Assume that the Ln(C) formula α cannot be proved in Kωn (C). Then by Lemma 19
there has to exist an Kωn (C) saturated set Γ which contains α. Thus the previous lemma
implies (Sω,Vω,Γ ) |= α, and hence α is not valid in all Kripke-frames for Ln(C). 
Since the system Kωn (C)+ (G-Cut) is sound and the system Kωn (C) is complete, all cuts
are superfluous. Hence we have a semantic proof of cut elimination for Kωn (C) + (G-Cut).
Corollary 23 (Total Cut Elimination for Kωn (C)). For all finite sets Γ of Ln(C) formulas
we have that
Kωn (C) + (G-Cut)  Γ ⇐⇒ Kωn (C)  Γ .
Proof. Let Γ be a set of Ln(C) formulas which is provable in Kωn (C) + (G-Cut). Then
Theorems 15 and 22 imply that Kωn (C)  Γ∨. Thus Γ has to be derivable in Kωn (C), as
can be seen by applying some inversions. The other direction of the claimed equivalence
is obvious. 
This result is also interesting in connection with work by Kaneko and Nagashima (cf.
e.g. [10,9]). They introduce an infinitary system GL(G) for common knowledge and obtain
cut elimination for GL(G). However, after cut elimination their “cut-free” proofs do not
have the subformula property; something like cuts may creep in in the context of another
rule. In contrast to that situation, proofs in Kωn (C) enjoy the subformula property, provided,
of course, that formulas Em(α) are regarded as subformulas of C(α).
6. The positive and the negative fragment of the system Kωn(C)
In the previous section we have seen that Kωn (C) is a cut-free and complete deductive
system for common knowledge — the price for this cut-freeness being the allowance
of infinitary derivations. However, although Kωn (C) is a system permitting infinitary
derivations, it contains (at least) two interesting finite subsystems: its positive and its
negative fragment. They are both finite in the sense that each positive (negative) assertion
of Ln(C) which is provable in Kωn (C) has a finite proof in the positive (negative) fragment
of Kωn (C).
An Ln(C) formula α is called positive if it does not contain occurrences of the dual ∼C
of the common knowledge operator; α is called negative if it does not contain the common
knowledge operator C (this means that a negative formula α may contain occurrences of
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C only in the form ∼C). Recall that all our formulas are in negation normal form and that
the negation of complex formulas is defined; thus “positive” and “negative” refer to the
occurrences of the subformulas about common knowledge.
The positive fragment Kωn (C+) of Kωn (C) is obtained from Kωn (C) by dropping the rule
(¬C) and restricting all other rules to finite sets of positive Ln(C) formulas; accordingly,
the negative fragment Kωn (C−) of Kωn (C) is obtained from Kωn (C) by dropping the rule
(ωC) and restricting all other rules to finite sets of negative Ln(C) formulas. Thus Kωn (C+)
contains the infinitary rule (ωC), whereas all rules of Kωn (C−) are finite.
Theorem 24 (Negative Fragment). Let Γ be a finite set of negative Ln(C) formulas. For
all ordinals σ we then have that
Kωn (C) σ Γ =⇒ Kωn (C−) <ω Γ .
Proof. We show this assertion by induction of σ and observe that Γ , which is a set of
negative Ln(C) formulas, cannot have been derived by the rule (ωC). All other rules have
only finitely many premises which are sets of negative Ln(C) formulas since no cuts are
permitted. With the help of the induction hypothesis we therefore immediately obtain what
we want. 
The situation is much more complicated in the case of the positive fragment Kωn (C+) of
Kωn (C): we have to finitize each application of the infinitary rule (ωC). To achieve this, we
count the nestings of the ∼Ki and prove Lemma 25 below. For all positive Ln(C) formulas
α the number ∂(α) is inductively defined as follows:
1. ∂(P) := ∂(∼P) := 0.
2. ∂(α ∨ β) := ∂(α ∧ β) := max(∂(α), ∂(β)).
3. ∂(Ki (α)) := ∂(C(α)) := ∂(α).
4. ∂(∼Ki (α)) := ∂(α) + 1.
Besides that, we extend this definition to all finite sets Γ of positive Ln(C) formulas by
setting
∂(Γ ) := sup(∂(α) : α ∈ Γ ).
It is easy to verify that for all positive Ln(C) formulas α we have the equality ∂(¬Ki (α)) =
∂(¬α) + 1 and, as a consequence thereof, for all finite sets Γ and ¬∆ of positive Ln(C)
formulas
¬Ki (∆) ⊂ Γ and ∆ = ∅ =⇒ ∂(¬∆) < ∂(Γ ).
Lemma 25. Let Γ be a finite set of positive Ln(C) formulas and α a positive Ln(C)
formula. Then we have for all ordinals σ , all natural numbers , m with ∂(Γ ) ≤  ≤ m
and all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} that
Kωn (C+) σ Ki (E(α)),Γ =⇒ Kωn (C+) nσ Ki (Em(α)),Γ .
Proof. We show this assertion by induction on σ and have to distinguish between the
following cases.
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1. {Ki (E(α))}∪Γ is an axiom of Kωn (C+). Then {Ki (Em(α))}∪Γ is an axiom of Kωn (C+)
as well.
2. {Ki (E(α))}∪Γ is the conclusion of a rule (∨), (∧) or (ωC). Then we apply the induction
hypothesis to the premise(s) of this rule and carry it through again afterwards in order to
derive what we want.
3. {Ki (E(α))} ∪ Γ is the conclusion of a rule (K j ), and the formula Ki (E(α)) is not
its main formula of this inference. Then there exist an ordinal τ < σ , a positive Ln(C)
formula β and a finite set ¬∆ of positive Ln(C) formulas so that
Kωn (C+) τ β,¬∆, (1)
{K j (β)} ∪ ¬K j (∆) ⊂ {Ki (E(α))} ∪ Γ . (2)
Keeping (2) in mind, we can simply apply the rule (K j ) to (1) in order to obtain our
assertion. The induction hypothesis is not needed in this case.
4. {Ki (E(α))}∪Γ is the conclusion of a rule (Ki ) with the main formula Ki (E(α)). Then
there exist an ordinal τ < σ and a finite set ¬∆ of positive Ln(C) formulas so that
Kωn (C+) τ E(α),¬∆, (3)
¬Ki (∆) ⊂ Γ . (4)
It simplifies matters to proceed with a further distinction of cases: whether∆ is the empty
set or not.
4.1.∆ = ∅. By Lemma 14 we obtain from (3)
Kωn (C+) τ α, (5)
and from that together with the rule (K) that
Kωn (C+) τ+1 Ki (Ek(α)),Γ (6)
for all natural numbers k and all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Since τ + 1 ≤ nσ , Lemma 13 yields our
claim.
4.2.∆ = ∅. In view of a previous consideration we know that in this case ∂(¬∆) < ∂(Γ ),
thus  = k + 1 for some natural number k. Moreover, Lemma 14 applied to (3) gives us
Kωn (C+) τ K j (Ek(α)),¬∆ (7)
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But k ≥ ∂(¬∆), and so the induction hypothesis applied to (7)
yields
Kωn (C+) nτ K j (Er (α)),¬∆ (8)
for all natural numbers r ≥ k and all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We continue with n − 1 applications
of the rule (∧) and conclude
Kωn (C+) nτ+(n−1) Em(α),¬∆ (9)
for all natural numbers m ≥ k + 1 = . Finally, by rule (Ki ) we can go over from (9) to
Kωn (C+) nτ+n Ki (Em(α)),¬Ki (∆) (10)
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for all natural numbers m ≥ . Since nτ + n ≤ nσ , our assertion follows immediately
from (10), (4) and Lemma 13. This completes the treatment of the last case and finishes
our proof. 
Theorem 26 (Positive Fragment). Let Γ be a finite set of positive Ln(C) formulas. For all
ordinals σ we then have that
Kωn (C) σ Γ =⇒ Kωn (C+) <ω Γ .
Proof. We prove this assertion by induction on σ and distinguish the following cases.
1. Γ is an axiom Kωn (C). Then we trivially have Kωn (C+) 0 Γ .
2. Γ is the conclusion of a rule (∨), (∧), (Ki ) or (∼Ki ). Each of these rules has only
finitely many premises to which the induction hypothesis is applied. Hence these premises
are finitely derivable, and in one further derivation step we thus have our assertion.
3. Γ is the conclusion of a rule (ωC). Then Γ contains an Ln(C) formula C(α) and there
exist ordinals σ1, σ2, . . . , so that for all natural numbers k ≥ 1
Kωn (C) σk Ek(α),Γ , (1)
σk < σ. (2)
Set  := ∂(Γ ) and apply the previous lemma to the “branches” 1 to + 1 of (1) in order to
obtain natural numbers r1, . . . , r+1 satisfying
Kωn (C+) rk Ek(α),Γ (3)
for all k ≤  + 1. Now we make use of Lemma 14 to obtain from (3)
Kωn (C+) r+1 Ki (E(α)),Γ (4)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus the previous lemma can be applied to (4), and we accomplish
Kωn (C) nr+1 Ki (Em(α)),Γ (5)
for all natural numbers m ≥  and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Consequently, by (n − 1)
applications of the rule (∧) and Lemma 13 we derive
Kωn (C) (n+1)r+1 Em+1(α),Γ (6)
for all m ≥ . Summing up, we have for all natural numbers k with 1 ≤ k ≤  that
Kωn (C+) rk Ek(α),Γ (7)
and for all natural numbers s >  that
Kωn (C+) (n+1)r+1 Es(α),Γ . (8)
For any natural number t greater than r1, . . . , r and (n + 1)r+1 we obtain from (7) and
(8) with the help of the rule (ωC) that
Kωn (C+) t C(α),Γ . (9)
Since Γ is a set of positive Ln(C) formulas, we have covered all possibilities of its
derivation, and our theorem is proved. 
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Notice that our positive fragment does not guarantee that all proofs are finite since infinite
branchings are still permitted. However, this problem can also be solved by introducing a
new calculus K<ωn (C+) which is obtained from Kωn (C+) by replacing the infinitary rule
Em(α),Γ (for all m ≥ 1)
C(α),Γ (ωC)
by the finitary rule
Em(α),Γ (for all m so that 1 ≤ m ≤ ∂(Γ ) + 1)
C(α),Γ (<ωC)
Working within the positive fragment, we can now show that the infinitary rule (ωC) can
be restricted to the finitary (<ωC).
Theorem 27. For any set Γ of positive Ln(C) formulas we have that
Kωn (C+)  Γ ⇐⇒ K<ωn (C+)  Γ .
Proof. The direction from left to right follows by induction on the proofs in Kωn (C+). The
reverse direction is proved by induction on the lengths of the proofs in K<ωn (C+), using
Lemma 25 in the induction step whenever the last rule applied in K<ωn (C+) is an instance
of (<ωC). 
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